Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of Contracts by Greely, Henry T.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - January 1989 Article 4 
1-1989 
Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary 
Purchasers on the Form of Contracts 
Henry T. Greely 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of 
Contracts, 42 Vanderbilt Law Review 133 (1989) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Contracts as Commodities: The
Influence of Secondary Purchasers
on the Form of Contracts
Henry T. Greely*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 133
II. SECONDARY PURCHASERS AND THE PRESSURE TO STANDARDIZE 135
A. Deciding to Buy: A Model for Consumers and Sec-
ondary Purchasers ............................... 136
B. Standardization of a Single Retailer's Contracts ... 138
C. Standardization of Contracts Within an Industry .. 140
III. STANDARDIZATION OF TANGIBLE PRODUCTS ................ 142
IV. CONTRACTS, SECONDARY PURCHASERS, AND THE STANDARDI-
ZATION OF FORMS: THREE EXAMPLES ...................... 145
A. Residential Mortgages ............................ 146
B. Oil and Gas Leases .............................. 149
C. Corporate Securities ............................. 152
V. ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ..................... 158
A. Barriers to an Efficient Level of Contract Commodity
Standardization ................................. 160
B. External Costs of Increased Contract Commodity
Standardization ................................. 166
C. Encouraging Contract Commodity Standardization. 168
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................. 169
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970 Professor Arthur Leff brought a new vision to a half cen-
tury of debate about standard form contracts' by pointing out that con-
* Associate Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I would like to thank Robert C. Ellickson,
Lawrence M. Friedman, Paul Goldstein, Mark G. Kelman, A. Mitchell Polinsky, and Howard Wil-
liams for useful comments on drafts of this Article. I would also like to acknowledge the continuing
influence of my Contracts professor, the late Arthur Leff, an extraordinary teacher and scholar.
Thomas Haensly provided valuable help as my research assistant. This research was supported by
a bequest from the Claire and Michael Brown Estate.
1. Of the works written before 1970 dealing with contracts of adhesion, perhaps the most
important are Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); Kessler, Contracts
of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLuM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Llewel-
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sumer contracts should be seen not primarily as "contracts," but as
"things," intangible products, sold to the consumer.2 As "things," Leff
argued, form contracts should be subject to the same kinds of warranty
laws as tangible goods. The debate about form contracts in consumer
transactions continues, but, as Leff predicted, the debate largely has
ignored his insight concerning the nature of the pieces of paper
involved.3
In the midst of this debate, there has been little analysis in the
legal literature, and none in the economics literature, of why standard
form contracts are used. Most authors merely revisit the reasons listed
by Karl Llewellyn in 1939:
Nothing can approach in speed and sanity of readaptation the machinery of stan-
dard forms of a trade and for a line of trade, built to meet the particular needs of
that trade. They save trouble in bargaining. They save time in bargaining. They
infinitely simplify the task of internal administration of a business unit, of keeping
tabs on transactions, of knowing where one is at, of arranging orderly expectation,
orderly fulfillment, orderly planning. They ease administration by concentrating
the need for discretion and decision in such personnel as can be trusted to be dis-
creet. This reduces human wear and tear, it cheapens administration, it serves the
ultimate consumer. Standardizing contracts is in this a counterpart of standard-
izing goods and production processes, as well as a device for adjustment of law to
need."
Combined, Leff's insight and Llewellyn's analysis point to another
lyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YA E L.J. 704 (1931); and Llewellyn,
Book Review, 52 HAv. L. REv. 700 (1939).
2. Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.L. Rzv. 131 (1970).
3. About the same time as Leff, Professor David Slawson came to a similar conclusion, al-
though without making the semantic jump that marks Leff's work. Slawson, Standard Form Con-
tracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971). Examples of the
more recent work concerning contracts of adhesion include two additional Slawson arti-
cles-Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1974), and Slaw-
son, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms,
46 U. PITT. L. REv. 21 (1984). For an economics perspective on adhesion contracts, see Kornhauser,
Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1151 (1976); Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests,
69 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1983) [hereinafter Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information]; Schwartz &
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. Rzv. 630 (1979) [hereinafter Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets];
and Trebilcock & Dewees, Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts, in THE ECONOMIC AP-
PROACH TO LAW (P. Burrows & C. Valjanovski ed. 1981). For a critical legal studies perspective, see
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983). Profes-
sors Charles Goetz and Robert Scott in their article Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 261 (1985), make a fascinating general argument about the role of the state in providing
standard implicit terms to contracts.
4. Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 1, at 701; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 211 comment a (1979). The only addition to Llewellyn's list that I have seen is one
author's suggestion that form contracts are used to maintain status and income differentials in the
selling organization. Rakoff, supra note 3, at 1223-24.
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pressure for standardization in some kinds of products. Left's contrac-
tual "things" implicated continuing rights and duties for both sides.
Leff dealt with "things" retailers sold to consumers, but in some indus-
tries either party to the initial sale may resell some of its rights and
duties to third parties. For example, a lender first "sells" a mortgage to
a home owner and then sells its interest in the mortgage to another
financial institution. When secondary sales are common, the forms are,
for many purposes, more akin to frozen pork bellies than to what law-
yers consider contracts. They are contracts as commodities.
This Article addresses the effects of secondary purchasers6 on the
standardization of form contracts. I became interested in this topic
while teaching about oil and gas leases in one class and about residen-
tial mortgages in two others. I concluded that secondary purchasers
should encourage retailers to standardize their forms across an indus-
try. To my surprise, I discovered that no writers on form contracts had
explored or mentioned the effect, or, in fact, acknowledged the exis-
tence of secondary purchasers. I also discovered a more complicated
pattern of form standardization than I had expected. This Article ex-
plores those complications in order to explain how contracts are used in
the "real world."
The Article first describes both the theoretical and empirical ef-
fects of secondary purchasers on form contracts. It then discusses the
process of standardization, both for tangible products and for several
examples of contractual commodities. After examining several factors
that help explain when and why form contracts are standardized, the
Article considers changes in policy that might follow from the analysis.
II. SECONDARY PURCHASERS AND THE PRESSURE TO STANDARDIZE
This section first creates a simple model of the decisions by con-
sumers and secondary purchasers to buy a contract commodity. It then
shows how the existence of secondary purchasers additionally presses
retailers to standardize the contracts they use in their business, first
5. By the term "contracts," I include documents, such as leases, mortgages, and securities,
that the law does not necessarily categorize as contracts. Earlier writers focused largely on con-
sumer purchases and, as a result, necessarily did not discuss these other form documents. I do not
believe that the analysis of such forms in this context is affected by their use to convey property
instead of promises.
6. I refer to secondary purchases and secondary purchasers rather than secondary markets
because traditional "markets" are not present in all of these contexts. While true secondary mar-
kets exist for corporate securities and residential mortgages, some of the contracts discussed in this
Article, such as oil and gas leases, are traded less formally. The incentive toward standardization
that this Article sets forth depends not on the existence of an organized, face to face competitive
market, but instead on the expectation that contracts may well be resold to secondary purchasers,
through a formal "market" or otherwise.
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within a single firm and then between all firms in an industry.7
A. Deciding to Buy: A Model for Consumers and Secondary
Purchasers
Assume that those who "buy" goods, whether tangible goods or
contracts such as a home mortgage, consider the following three factors
in determining the cost of an offered contract: Information costs; price;
and administration costs. These costs exist whether the buyer is the
consumer or a secondary purchaser. In the case of the home mortgage,
for example, the home owner "buys" the mortgage from a lender, who
in turn sells its interest in the mortgage to a secondary purchaser.
The buyer's information costs include search costs in finding the
contractual product and costs incurred by taking the time to read, un-
derstand, and compare the contract to competing alternatives. In some
cases, these costs might be trivial; while in others, they could include
substantial expenses such as lawyers' fees. The price is the net present
value of the buyer's outlays to acquire the contract. The buyer's admin-
istration costs are the net present value of the time and money the
buyer expects to spend dealing with the contract in the future, both in
the contract's normal operation and in its operation when things go
wrong, with an adjustment for the probabilities that various problems
might occur. For the consumer purchasing a home mortgage, normal
administration costs include the time, stamps, and checking account
fees incurred in making monthly mortgage payments. The costs of deal-
ing with problems such as erroneous notices of default are termed ab-
normal administration costs in this Article. For a secondary purchaser
of mortgages, normal costs include the accounting time and effort in
sorting, recording, and depositing mortgage checks, while foreclosure
expenses are an example of abnormal administration costs.8
A buyer following this simple model will purchase a tangible good
or a contractual good when the difference between the good's expected
value and cost, including all three components, is both positive and
7. There are two sets of buyers and sellers in these transactions: a business enters into a
transaction with a consumer that involves a contract, and the business then sells the contract to a
secondary purchaser. The buyers and sellers can become confusing, so for the purposes of this
Article I refer to the three sets of parties as consumers, retailers, and secondary purchasers, even
though the parties may not fit into the customary meanings of those terms.
8. The relative importance of these three costs to contract commodities probably is not in-
herently different from their importance on average to more tangible goods. Although the informa-
tion costs and administration costs of buying a loaf of bread are usually infinitesimal, other
tangible products, such as automobiles, have significant information and administration costs.
Contract commodities, however, almost always entail some information and administration costs.
Such contracts set up a continuing relationship that requires administration and, usually, educa-
tion of the purchaser to the terms and conditions of the contract.
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greater than the expected net value of other uses of that time and
money. Thus, a seller of these products may employ several strategies
to make its product more attractive to purchasers. It could increase the
product's expected usefulness, lower the product's price, or lower the
buyer's information or administration costs. Standardizing form con-
tracts can implement the last strategy.
Limited by two additional assumptions, this simple model of
purchasing decisions demonstrates why the retailer's strategy of reduc-
ing information and administration costs is more effective with second-
ary purchasers of contracts than with consumers. First, the secondary
purchasers generally purchase many of these contracts, while consumers
purchase few-at most, one every few years. Thus, lenders expect to sell
home mortgages not to small individual investors, but to major financial
institutions, which buy thousands or even millions of mortgages. Sec-
ond, secondary purchasers are more concerned than consumers with the
"fine print" of a contract, provisions that do not bear substantially on
the price or other terms of the transactions. The strongest justification
for this assumption is that the fine print enumerates relatively low
probability events. An individual homeowner may not worry substan-
tially about a provision that governs the effect of an improbable event
on her mortgage, regardless of the magnitude of the possible loss. A
secondary purchaser with a large portfolio of contracts faces a larger
probability that a fine print provision will affect some of those
contracts.9
9. This argument is that a rational consumer would not care about the fine print; but it is
not an argument based on risk aversion. While an individual homeowner might be expected to be
more risk averse than an institutional investor in mortgages, even with a risk aversion premium,
the low probability of an occurrence keeps a consumer from shopping for fine print. Similarly, an
institutional investor who invests in mortgages still cares about the fine print because the negative
effect of the fine print is not a random event that the investor could diversify to avoid. On the
contrary, unlike the specific risks on an individual stock, an investor can completely prevent the
occurrence of some fine print losses by examining the fine print before purchasing.
As an alternative explanation for consumer indifference to fine print, one might argue that
consumers are irrationally ignorant of and unconcerned about fine print. This proposition may well
be true of most consumers, who neither understand all the clauses of a mortgage nor consider
hiring an attorney to explain them. That argument would break down if some significant number
of consumers did care about the fine print. As Professors Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde have
shown, a small minority of careful shoppers may drive a market to an appropriate outcome. See
generally Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 3. Thus, if some careful shoppers
exist and a retailer appeals to those careful shoppers by standardizing its fine print, then markets
should work to standardize form contracts even without secondary purchasers. The low probability
of a clause coming into effect undercuts this point, because even careful individual shoppers, quite
rationally, are not concerned about some of the fine print.
1989]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
B. Standardization of a Single Retailer's Contracts
Contract standardization within a firm is encouraged when the firm
sells the contracts to a secondary purchaser rather than holding them.
Take the example of a lender that sells its mortgages to a secondary
purchaser. The secondary purchaser saves both information costs and
administration costs when all the mortgages from the lender have one
form.
The purchaser reduces information costs because it does not have
to dicker over a slightly different price for each different form, it does
not have to examine each individual mortgage to discover whether the
terms are legal or prudent, and it does not need to involve its own hier-
archy in either effort. In this respect, a standardized form has the same
information-cost reducing function as a seller's good reputation.
In theory, a secondary purchaser has a strong incentive to purchase
only a standardized form mortgage even if it purchases only two of
them. If the purchaser buys only standardized mortgages, then the ad-
ditional or marginal cost to read and understand the form is zero after
the first purchase. These costs might be so small as to be invisible in
the purchase of any one mortgage, but when secondary purchasers buy
hundreds, thousands, or tens of thousands of contracts, the information
cost savings from standardization can be enormous and very visible.
Similarly, the secondary purchaser's administration costs are lower
if the lender's mortgage forms are internally standardized. Contract ad-
ministration costs arise when the secondary purchaser has to deal with
the borrower in, for example, a collection dispute.10 Dealing with a bor-
rower is much simpler and therefore much cheaper if the servicer of the
mortgage knows the terms of each mortgage without reading the fine
print. For example, a secondary purchaser's employee could make accu-
rate statements over the telephone to a borrower about the mortgage
without having to locate, retrieve, and read that particular borrower's
mortgage."
An individual borrower, by contrast, derives no direct advantages
in her mortgage "purchasing" decision from a lender's internal stand-
ardization. First, although a borrower might benefit by not having to
10. The retailer in some secondary purchaser situations retains these administrative func-
tions even after selling the contract. For example, a savings and loan or other institution that sells
a mortgage often remains the servicing agent for the purchaser of the mortgage. Pressure from the
secondary purchaser does not necessarily operate as a force for standardization in those situations,
although, of course, contract administration is then cheaper and a direct benefit for the retailer
with standardized contracts.
11. Similarly, if, as Rakoff postulates, the retailer is motivated to use form contracts by con-
siderations of intrafirm status and hierarchy, the secondary purchaser may well find standardized
forms useful for those purposes. See generally Rakoff, supra note 3.
[Vol. 42:133
CONTRACTS AS COMMODITIES
compare different forms offered by one lender, the model set forth
above assumes that the borrower, quite rationally, does not read or care
about the fine print. Standardizing the fine print, therefore, does not
reduce her information costs. 12 To the extent that a borrower reads the
mortgage after the purchase and thus incurs administration costs,
standardization again fails to lower her costs. The borrower buys only
one contract whether or not the lender uses only one mortgage form
and, in the normal or abnormal administration of their relationship, the
borrower deals with one and only one form. Of course, to the extent
that the use of a standardized form lowers the lender's costs or in-
creases the resale value of the mortgage to the lender, some of those
gains may be passed on to the borrower through a lower price, depend-
ing on the structure of the market involved. The borrower, however,
does not realize the savings directly.
Because the secondary purchaser's information and administration
costs are lower if a lender uses one standard form for all its mortgages,
that lender gains a competitive edge and may be able to get a higher
price from the secondary purchaser than the lender who offers a pack-
age of varying mortgages. The lender gains no similar advantages at the
borrower's level because standardization does not make the mortgage
more valuable to the borrower. Therefore, lenders who resell their mort-
gages have greater incentives to standardize their forms than lenders
who hold their mortgages.
Secondary purchasers do not constitute an irresistible force. The
savings to be gained from standardizing only lower the information
costs of a secondary purchaser of mortgages; standardization does not
eliminate them. For example, the secondary purchaser still may need to
determine whether intrinsic fraud might render the mortgage unen-
forceable even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, whether
the real estate securing the mortgage has the stated value, whether the
borrowers are creditworthy, or, for that matter, whether the borrowers
or the security even exist.13
12. If an unusually acute consumer cares about the fine print in the mortgage, in contrast to
the assumption made above, see supra note 9, she still may not save information costs as a result
of intrafirm standardization. The concerned consumer's information costs remain unchanged if the
firm would have offered her one and only one mortgage form, but not necessarily the same contract
offered to all other borrowers. She has to read and evaluate only one form in either case. A lender's
internal standardization would reduce the information costs of this atypical informed borrower
only if the lender otherwise would offer her a choice of forms.
13. Standardization, in another sense, could reduce the costs of purchasing mortgages from a
credible lender. A secondary purchaser of mortgages might be willing to rely on a lender's repre-
sentations that each of the borrowers met certain previously accepted credit standards or that the
real estate had been appraised by previously agreed upon appraisal standards. The secondary pur-
chaser then could avoid examining the creditworthiness of each borrower or the value of each
parcel of real estate securing the mortgage. That kind of "process" standardization can be con-
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Standardization may also have costs. "Nonstandard" situations
may demand nonstandardized contracts. According to the argument
Professors Goetz and Scott have called the "Expanded Choice postu-
late," however, if the value gained in a transaction by a "custom tai-
lored" contract exceeded the value gained from standardization, a firm
would not standardize in the first place and there would be no costs.1'
Finally, the needs of secondary purchasers are not the only reasons
for standardization. As Llewellyn noted,'15 there are a host of good rea-
sons for a firm to standardize its contracts. The existence of secondary
purchasers for those contracts just adds one more reason.
Whether the existence of secondary purchasers pushes a company
to standardize its forms depends on the individual circumstances. It
seems clear, though, that the existence of secondary purchasers is a
force encouraging standardization. The size of the effect may vary, but
its direction is constant. Thus, in markets with secondary purchasers,
retailers should ensure that their contract form is acceptable not only
to themselves and their consumers, but also to secondary purchasers.16
C. Standardization of Contracts Within an Industry
Secondary purchasers encourage industry-wide standardization as
well as standardization within a single firm. A secondary purchaser who
tained as a term of the contract between the lender and the secondary purchaser. The inclusion of
this term represents a form of standardizing the sold commodity, although it is not a part of what
lawyers call the standard form contract between the lender and the borrower. Government entities
can enforce such standardization, as they have at least partially in residential mortgage markets.
Federal regulators or insurers of banks and thrifts require those institutions to follow written
credit policies and to obtain appraisals on specified forms before extending residential loans. The
regulators have done so out of concern for the safety of bank and thrift loans, not for the informa-
tion costs of secondary purchasers. Nevertheless, those costs should have been reduced as a result
of these requirements.
14. Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 262. The "Expanded Choice postulate" urges that the
existence of a voluntary standard form contract imposes no costs because the parties for whom the
standard form is not optimal will contract around it. Professors Goetz and Scott criticize this argu-
ment in the context of government imposition of standard implied terms through, for example, the
Uniform Commercial Code, stressing the barriers to nonstandard forms from judicial interpreta-
tion and coordination costs. The application of these criticisms, and others, to industry-developed
standard contracts is discussed infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
Nonstandard forms also may provide the retailer with another advantage. A consumer's pref-
erence between several contract forms may give the retailer some valuable information about that
consumer. For example, if a borrower chose a mortgage that put at risk the proverbial "pound of
flesh," the lender learns something valuable about the borrower's view of the probability of
default.
15. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
16. This fact has at least one important consequence: increased oversight of the form. The
secondary purchaser will want to make sure that it will be legally able (or, as a matter of public
relations or policy, willing) to enforce the important terms of the contracts. This additional level of
legal and prudential oversight of the transaction should discourage gross errors of judgment or
legal analysis.
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buys contracts from a number of retailers within an industry prefers
not only that each retailer use one preapproved form for its sales, but
also that all retailers from which it plans to buy contracts use the same
preapproved form. Just as uniformity of one retailer's forms reduces a
secondary purchaser's information and administration costs in transac-
tions with that retailer, so does uniformity throughout the industry de-
crease the secondary purchaser's costs by lowering both its information
costs in shopping among retailers and its administration costs. And just
as consumers have no direct cost savings from one firm's decision to
standardize its form contracts, they also have no direct gains from in-
dustry-wide standardization. 17 The analysis for industry-wide standard-
ization is the same as it is for firm-wide standardization.
The cost savings to the secondary purchaser should push retailers
toward industry-wide standardization. Those savings ultimately may
accrue to consumers, retailers, secondary purchasers, or some combina-
tion thereof, depending on how competitive the secondary purchaser-
retailer and retailer-consumer markets are, but the savings should drive
retailers to standardize regardless of who eventually benefits. Either re-
tailers capture the savings themselves through higher prices from sec-
ondary purchasers, or those savings allow them to compete effectively
for secondary purchasers or consumers.
As in the single retailer example, there are costs to industry-wide
standardization. Some firms may face markets for which the industry-
wide standard form is not appropriate either for consumers or for sec-
ondary purchasers. For example, a lender might have to deal with un-
usual state laws or might lend to particularly high or low risk
borrowers. If the form was voluntary and the gains from using a unique
form outweighed the forgone gains that otherwise stem from standardi-
zation, then that lender would not use the industry's standard form.
Similarly, some pressures for industry-wide standardization con-
tinue even without secondary purchasers. For example, an industry-
wide standard contract should reduce costs directly for retailers by lim-
iting the time and expense a retailer spends drafting or deciding among
various contracts.'
17. In theory, there still may be some small information or administrative cost savings to a
consumer from using an industry-wide standardized form. The consumer's direct costs may be
unchanged, but the costs of consulting third parties about the contract-financial planners before
buying, attorneys after buying-might be slightly lower because those third parties would be famil-
iar with the forms. The practical effects of such possible savings on consumer decisions seem
minimal.
, 18. Additionally, the existence of an industry-wide standard form gives consumers, retailers,
and secondary purchasers potentially valuable information about the terms that their competitors
have accepted. By using the industry standard form, they do not place themselves at a competitive
disadvantage; by negotiating an advantageous amendment to the industry standard form, they
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A recent example from financial markets illustrates the advantages
of standardized form contracts, both for individual firms and across an
industry. Interest rate and currency swaps allow firms to change the
interest rate, term, or currency of their financial liabilities by trading
those liabilities with another firm for liabilities of equivalent value. For
example, a firm that owes 10 million dollars can use a currency swap to
trade its liability under that debt with another firm that owes an
equivalent amount in Swiss francs. Although this type of swap market
is less than ten years old, liabilities worth greater than 300 billion dol-
lars are traded each year.
In March 1987 The Wall Street Journal reported that the Interna-
tional Swap Dealers Association had developed a standard contract to
govern swaps. The report estimated that by standardizing the docu-
mentation the new contract could save companies as much as ten thou-
sand dollars in legal costs on each swap and also facilitate assigning
swaps to new buyers, which would aid the developing secondary
market.19
In at least some contexts, industries do standardize their forms, but
how and when? The third section of the Article discusses how tangible
goods are standardized. The fourth section examines the standardiza-
tion of three kinds of form contracts. 0
III. STANDARDIZATION OF TANGIBLE PRODUCTS
The economy is full of formally and informally standardized prod-
ucts, from motor oil to paper towels to "IBM PC compatible" com-
puters. Until recently, product standards had attracted little attention
from economists and lawyers. Economist David Hemenway wrote the
first major analysis of the process of product standardization in 1975.21
improve their relative position.
19. Monroe, Dealers Design a Standard Contract for Swaps of Interest Rates, Currencies,
Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1987, at 38, col. 1. Note that the standard contract here, the "swap," is the
form used to transfer other contracts. The secondary market referred to by The Wall Street Jour-
nal is a secondary market in the swaps, not in the underlying contractual liabilities.
20. The discussion in the text assumes that secondary purchasers buy the entire contract,
but the same effects might occur when only a portion of the contractual rights or duties is resold.
Thus, in cash consumer sales, the retailer might "resell" some of its contractual warranty obliga-
tion by insuring itself. The insurance company involved may want to approve a standard form of
warranty used before issuing insurance. Variation in warranty terms would increase the costs to
the insurance company of determining the degree of liability it is being asked to assume and of
administering its payment obligations.
21. D. HEMENWAY, INDUSTRYWIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS (1975). Most of the recent
discussions of standardization have focused on interchangeability standards, also called "network
externalities." Major concerns have included the effects of standardization on subsequent innova-
tion and the possible uses of standardization to increase a manufacturer's market power. See, e.g.,
J. FARRELL & G. SALONER, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN STANDARDIZATION, (Department of Economics, Mas-
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Hemenway divided product standards into three major classes: single
product standards, intermediate standards, and interchangeability stan-
dards. Single product standards define the characteristics of a product
and ensure its uniformity. For example, the Society of Automotive En-
gineers issues motor oil standards defining 10-W-30 motor oil. Interme-
diate standards describe products used in physical connection with
other standardized products. For example, paper towel dispensers must
meet size standards if paper towel sizes are standardized. What Hemen-
way called interchangeability standards (often termed "network" stan-
dards) are the standards needed to use a common network. Thus,
interchangeability standards for telephones are those standards that
must be met for a telephone to use the regular telephone network.
Some standards are ancient. Defined weights and measures date at
least to the Old Testament. An English dictionary is a more recent
standard. In the United States, "time" itself is an even more recent
legally defined standard, set initially in the 1880s by the most affected
industry, the railroads, and eventually enforced by federal legislation."2
Product standards, however, first became significant during the 1910s
and 1920s with the growth of the automobile industry. The relatively
small number of automobile manufacturers sought and obtained agree-
ments on standardized parts from their suppliers through the private
Society of Automotive Engineers. During the 1920s the Commerce De-
partment's Division of Simplified Practice, with the encouragement of
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, convinced businesses in less
concentrated industries to collaborate on product standards. The fed-
sachusetts Institute of Technology Working Paper No. 393, 1985) (source on file with Author));
Farrell & Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985);
Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424
(1985).
22. Before the 1880s, each town kept its own "time," based more or less exactly on when the
sun was directly overhead in the town's particular location. As a result, major cities, even those in
close proximity, kept time that varied by several minutes. This variation made little difference
until the spread of railroads; railroads found it too difficult and confusing to adopt the local time
of each stop. In order to schedule trains efficiently and safely, the entire railroad system had to
know exactly when a train would be on each track-and it had to agree on the "when." The major
Canadian and American railroads met in two conventions in October 1883 and divided the United
States into roughly the present four time zones for the purposes of train scheduling. While most
railroads and localities adopted railroad time, a few continued to keep their own time, or more
commonly, to keep the time of an adjacent zone. During World War I, following the lead of the
European combatants, Congress decided that the war effort required daylight savings time, set
within standard time zones. The result was legislation that authorized the Interstate Commerce
Commission to set and enforce time zones. In 1967 the Commission gladly acquiesced when Con-
gress transferred this thankless task to the newly created Department of Transportation. The
Transportation Department still controls the nation's time, which today mainly involves reviewing
applications for changes in the coverage of daylight savings time. See ASSISTANT GEN. COUNSEL FOR
REGULATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., STANDARD TIME IN THE UNITED STATES (1970).
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eral government's National Bureau of Standards continued to en-
courage standardization throughout the New Deal and World War 11.23
Since World War II, voluntary but formal standardization has in-
creased greatly. In 1977 the Department of Commerce estimated the
total number of standards at 25,000; other estimates about that time
put the total between 25,000 and 50,000. Growth was explosive, with an
earlier private report suggesting that the number of standards would
double during the 1970s. Some of these standards are in fact codes,
such as the National Fire Protection Association's Life Safety Code,
which contains thousands of individual standards. 24
Even the product standardization process has been standardized. 5
A large number of private organizations specialize in writing particular
kinds of standards. These standards-setting groups include organiza-
tions that cross industry lines, such as the National Fire Protection As-
sociation, the American Society for Testing and Materials, or
Underwriters Laboratory, as well as smaller groups that focus on a sin-
gle industry, such as the Society of Automotive Engineers.
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) coordinates
the process. ANSI recommends the procedures to be followed by indi-
vidual standards-setting groups. The standards-setting procedure ap-
proved by ANSI resembles a particularly excruciating administrative
rulemaking, 2  but if a group follows the ANSI-recommended proce-
23. See generally D. HEMENWAY, supra note 21.
24. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON VOLUNTARY STANDARDS AND TESTING LABORA-
TORY ACCREDITATION 11 n.19 (July 8, 1977) [hereinafter VOLUNTARY STANDARDS REPORT], cited in PR
DIXON, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR: THOUGHTS ON INTEREST REPRESENTATION
AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 2 (1978).
25. See generally D. HEMENWAY, supra note 21, and R. DIXON, supra note 24, for a discussion
of the process of standard making.
26. For example, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a very active ANSI-ap-
proved standards-setting body, follows a 10 step process in adopting a standard:
1) After receiving a request for standardization, the NFPA publishes a notice of intent to
consider the request, seeking public comments.
2) The NFPA's Standards Council considers the request and the public comments.
3) If the request and comments indicate a possible need for a standard, the NFPA organizes a
Technical Committee to review the proposal in detail.
4) The NFPA solicits proposals for a draft text of the standard.
5) The Technical Committee acts on the proposed texts, and after documenting various views,
from Committee members and others, drafts a standard, which must be supported by two-
thirds of the Committee.
6) The NFPA publishes the draft standard with the Technical Committee's comments in the
NFPA Technical Committee Reports to obtain outside views.
7) The Technical Committee considers the public comments on the draft standard.
8) The draft standard, with comments and changes, is published again, this time in Technical
Committee Documentation.
9) After any changes by the Technical Committee in response to public comments, the pro-




dures, then the resulting standard has the status of an "American Na-
tional Standard," in addition to being the standard of the originating
group. Although no juridical force flows from recognition of a standard
as an American National Standard, recognition adds credibility and sta-
tus. ANSI also can ask a standards making organization to set a stan-
dard on a particular subject or it can pass directly on a proposed
standard submitted to it by an organization or person.
Consumer group complaints of a lack of consumer representation
and small business complaints of anticompetitive activity made the
standardization process controversial in the 1970s. A Federal Trade
Commission report, several sets of Congressional hearings, and a report
from the Department of Commerce seem to have led only to consumer
representatives on more committees.2 7
Some products are more likely to be standardized than others. As
Hemenway points out, most industry-wide voluntary standards govern
intermediate goods, which are used in the production of some other
goods. The pressure for standards typically comes from consumers of
those intermediate goods. Standardization is most likely when those
consumers are a relatively small number of firms, as in the automobile
industry, in which each firm has significant knowledge of and interest in
standardization. Standardization is less likely when the product is sold
to unconcentrated industries and least likely when the product is sold
to the general public.28 Government intervention, of course, can change
those probabilities.
IV. CONTRACTS, SECONDARY PURCHASERS, AND THE STANDARDIZATION
OF FORMS: THREE EXAMPLES
This section examines three examples of contract commodities that
are resold to secondary purchasers: residential mortgages, oil and gas
leases, and corporate securities. Although other examples are possible,29
10) After debate, the NFPA membership then votes on whether to adopt the standard.
R. DIXON, supra note 24, at 71 app. C.
27. R. DIXON, supra note 24; see FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Study of Standards and Certi-
fication (1972); Hearings on Voluntary Industrial Standards, Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Hearings on S. 3555,
Voluntary Standards and Certification Act, Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Hearings on Energy Conserva-
tion-Home Heating Systems, Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); VOLUNTARY STANDARDS REPORT,
supra note 24, cited in R. DIXON, supra note 24, at 2. Concerns about the antitrust implications of
standardization continued into the 1980s. See text accompanying notes 86-88.
28. D. HEMENWAY, supra note 21, at 78-79.
29. For example, negotiable instruments might be characterized as "form contracts" that
have been standardized by legislative action within states and, through the Uniform Commercial
Code, between states. Similarly, insurance policies are also contracts that are "traded" in a second-
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I selected these three either because of my familiarity with the industry
or because the industry has spawned an extensive literature. For each
example, the subsection describes the nature and extent of the second-
ary purchasers involved and the degree of intra-industry standardiza-
tion of the contract forms involved.
A. Residential Mortgages
Mortgages and deeds of trust are essentially contracts, particularly
when viewed in the context of their associated loan applications and
notes.30 The mortgagee generally promises to advance funds; the mort-
gagor promises to make certain payments and gives the mortgagee cer-
tain rights in the real property that secures the obligation. The most
important right that the mortgagor gives to the mortgagee is the right
to foreclose, but other rights, such as the right to enjoin waste, also are
granted either in the instrument or by law.
Residential mortgages have been resold at least since the 1930s. In
February 1938, President Roosevelt chartered the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA, also known as Fannie Mae), pursuant to
authority granted by the National Housing Act of 1934. From 1938
through 1968, the FNMA purchased and resold residential mortgages
that either were insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
or guaranteed by the Veteran's Administration (VA) with funds ac-
quired, directly or indirectly, from the Treasury. 1 The FNMA also ac-
quired certain direct lending obligations for residential construction of
particular federal interest, such as subsidized low income housing. In
ary market. Rather than directly sell their interests in insurance policies to secondary purchasers,
insurance companies "reinsure" issued policies with "reinsurance" companies. These companies,
for a fee, assume all or part of the liability involved in the insurance policy. The reinsurers need
information about those contracts even though, unlike investors in stocks or in residential mort-
gages, they technically are not "buying" the contracts. To the extent the insurance policies are
uniform, the reinsurers' information costs decline.
In some states, state regulations ensure that major varieties of insurance are sold through
state-wide standard contracts. For example, state insurance regulatory commissions may dictate
some of the terms that firms must include in automobile liability policies, while authorizing certain
optional terms. A reinsurer then can accept a package of automobile liability insurance policies
from a given state without having to examine the terms and conditions of each individual policy.
Instead, it only needs to determine the policy limits and optional terms involved. Although insur-
ance regulators may not require standard policy forms for the purpose of improving the marketa-
bility of policies to reinsurers, that improvement has been a result.
30. In this Article, the term "mortgage" includes both mortgages and deeds of trust, as well
as the notes they secure.
31. Congress gave the FNMA statutory authority to acquire conventional loans under certain
restrictions in 1938, but the FNMA never exercised that authority. In 1948 Congress revoked it.
Liebold, Uniform Conventional Mortgage Documents: FHLMC Style, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & Ta. J.
435, 437 n.13 (1972).
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1968 Congress split the FNMA into two entities.32 The legislation gave
secondary market operations to a federally chartered but privately
owned corporation, which retained the name FNMA. The other func-
tions were delegated to the newly created Government National Mort-
gage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae).
While the FNMA provided a secondary market for federally in-
sured or guaranteed loans, "conventional" mortgage loans were the sub-
ject of limited secondary activity. Although thrift associations
originated most of these conventional mortgages, some were issued by
mortgage bankers, who then sold the mortgages to long-term investors.
Congress passed the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 as a
reaction to a shortage in housing finance caused by tight money.3 3 The
Act authorized the FNMA to purchase conventional mortgages, under
certain restrictions, and created a new federally owned corporation, the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac),
to purchase mortgages, conventional or otherwise, from thrift associa-
tions. The stated intent of the Act was to promote the development of a
national secondary market in conventional mortgages. The newly pri-
vate FNMA financed its purchases largely by issuing bonds secured by
the mortgages it bought. The FHLMC purchased mortgage loans with
funds obtained from both the federal treasury and its own mortgage-
backed bonds.
During the 1970s, private markets in residential mortgages ex-
panded tremendously as lenders in regions with above average housing
activity sold mortgages to financial institutions in areas of limited hous-
ing activity. The originating lender could sell entire mortgages or per-
centage "participations" in mortgages. In most cases, the originating
institution retained the duty to "service" the mortgage in return for a
servicing fee.
More recently, private institutions have begun to purchase mort-
gages to back two new forms of securities: mortgage pool participations
and private mortgage-backed bonds. Mortgage pool participations allow
an investor to buy a fractional interest in mortgages that the issuing
institution has bought and assembled as a "pool." Private mortgage-
backed bonds technically are debts of the issuing institution, but are
secured by the residential mortgages.3 4 For federal income tax purposes,
a trustee holds the mortgages and distributes principal and interest
payments to the security holders. The securities can be either "straight
32. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968).
33. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450 (1970).
34. The first of these securities was a private, mortgage-backed bond issued by the Bank of
America in 1977. Lance, Balancing Private and Public Initiatives in the Mortgage-Backed Secur-
ity Market, 18 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 426, 430 (1983).
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pass-through" securities, in which an investor in the security receives a
certain percentage of the proceeds from the pool of mortgages; "fully
modified pass-through" securities, in which the issuer guarantees the
investor a preset return, regardless of the actual payments made on the
mortgage pool; or "partial modified pass-through" securities, in which
the issuer guarantees the investor's previously set rate against some
risks, but not against mortgagor default. 5
Institutional secondary purchasers would have benefited from the
reduced information costs that national mortgage standardization
brings, but the standardization that did develop was limited by differ-
ences in state property law. Early in their existence, the FHA and VA,
federal agencies that insure or guarantee certain mortgages, developed
state-by-state standard mortgage forms for the mortgages presented to
them. Industry associations, including the influential United States
League of Savings and Loan Associations, also proposed various model
mortgage forms. Nevertheless, mortgage lenders did not standardize
mortgages nationally until the creation of the FHLMC.
In 1970 the FNMA and the newly formed FHLMC decided to write
a uniform mortgage document. The FHLMC is a federal instrumental-
ity controlled by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), and
the FNMA, although now a private entity, retains important links to
the Federal government (including five Presidential appointees on its
fifteen-member board). Nevertheless, this standardization was not a
"governmental" act. As the FHLMC's first general counsel wrote, the
FHLMC "has the authority to require any mortgage which it buys to be
on a particular form, but any private corporation has the same
power." 36
In January 1972 the FNMA and the FHLMC, after obtaining in-
dustry and consumer representative comments, published separate
forms on which all mortgages that it bought would have to be written. 7
The forms contained one group of uniform covenants, applicable to
mortgages from any state. The drafters included standard riders, which
contained nonuniform covenants, to be used in individual states. At
first the FNMA and FHLMC forms had a few significant differences,
but the two bodies eventually compromised on a mutual form, which,
by 1983, was used in about eighty percent of all residential loans in the
United States." Federal mortgage purchasing requirements do not bind
35. Id.
36. Liebold, supra note 31, at 437.
37. One participant in the FHLMC/FNMA standard form process has written an interesting
account of the evolution of the form. Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interaction of
Economics, Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PaoP. PROB. & TR. J. 397 (1972).
38. Lance, supra note 34, at 438.
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the newer private secondary markets. Nevertheless, the mortgage
pools39 generally have limited the mortgages they are willing to buy to
mortgages that conform to federal requirements.
The recent introduction of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) has
counteracted some of the standardizing work of the FNMA and the
FHLMC. Federal and state regulations have limited the permissible va-
rieties of ARMs, but a large number of options are still available. The
options available to the consumer and retailer (in this case the mortga-
gor and mortgagee) using an ARM include the ability to select any one
of a number of interest rate indices, the freedom to negotiate different
limits on interest rate changes in a given year or during the life of the
loan, and the ability to allow or ban negative amortization.
Standardizing influences, however, have begun to affect ARMs. On
October 12, 1987, the FNMA announced that it was standardizing its
purchases of adjustable rate mortgages. 40 The FNMA had purchased
adjustable rate mortgages since 1981, but only by negotiating individual
purchases with specific lenders. The FNMA's policy now is to purchase
ARMs if they are tied to an index rate of one-year United States Trea-
sury securities and to include provisions limiting interest rate changes
to not more than two percentage points per year and not more than six
percentage points over the life of the loan.41 The FHLMC announced
the next day a plan to purchase more ARMs.42 According to the Wall
Street Journal, the president of the FHLMC stated that "creating a
security from convertible ARMs will help standardize the ARM securi-
ties market and establish a 'solid secondary market for convertible
loans.' -48
B. Oil and Gas Leases
Landowners or owners of mineral interests enter into oil and gas
leases in order to have oil or gas companies explore for, develop, and
produce oil and gas deposits. These leases, which perhaps more accu-
rately are characterized as part real property conveyance and part con-
tract, give the lessee the right to explore for, drill for, and, if successful,
produce oil and gas. In addition, these leases give the lessee all surface
39. The mortgage pools, of course, face these same pressures to standardize as a result of the
information costs of purchasers of their securities in what amounts to a tertiary market for resi-
dential mortgages.
40. McQueen, Fannie Mae to Start Standardized Plan for Buying ARMs, Wall St. J., Oct.
13, 1987, at 55, col. 1.
41. Id.
42. McQueen, Freddie Mac to Buy $2.1 Billion Loans to Aid Adjustable Rate-Mortgage Sec-




easements necessary for those operations. The oil and gas leases used in
the industry are an odd mix of standardization and variety; they almost
always establish the same basic relationships, but they vary widely in
their fine print."
The lease ordinarily conveys to the lessee the exclusive right to ex-
plore, drill, and produce hydrocarbons for a stated period of time-the
"primary term." If during the primary term of the lease the lessee suc-
ceeds in producing commercial amounts of oil or gas, then the lease
remains in force as long as commercial production continues. Generally,
the lessor receives a cash bonus, an annual "delay rental" for years dur-
ing the primary term without drilling or production, and, as a royalty, a
percentage or fractional share of any production. In most leases, express
terms permit either party to assign the lease, in whole or in part.
Secondary sales of identifiable oil and gas leases do not occur in
public markets and therefore are hard to quantify. Nevertheless, they
take place constantly. An oil or gas company in the business of explor-
ing, drilling, and producing-termed an "operating company"-often
will assign, in whole or part, leases it initially acquired. For legal or
economic reasons, another company may be willing to pay a premium
for a lease in order to assemble a contiguous block of leases. Alterna-
tively, the assigning company's interest in the lease may wane based on
its market situation or its assessment of the area's geology. Finally,
even when the original lessee wants to develop the area, it may assign a
lease, in whole or in part, to pay for services, to raise capital, or just to
spread the risks of exploration.
Some property is leased, not by operating companies, but by an-
other important player in the industry, independent "leasehounds" or
"landmen." Landmen work as independent contractors, oil company
employees, or on their own behalf. In addition to obtaining leases for
operating companies, landmen often will buy up what they perceive to
be undervalued oil and gas leases as speculative investments. If the oil
industry later becomes interested in the region, then the landmen will
sell the lease to an operating company.
Largely as a result of these various lease assignments, oil compa-
nies acquire interests in leases written on a variety of different
preprinted forms. The companies recognize the problems that varying
lease forms can cause. As one attorney for Exxon has written:
Exxon Company, U.S.A. stewards over 120,000 leases and maintains an enormous
staff to perform this function. This function is greatly aided when the staff is famil-
iar with and understands the terms of each individual lease and knows that the
form has been drafted to avoid ambiguities and internal conflicts. If each of the
120,000 or so lessors insisted that his or her form be utilized for lease negotiations,
44. See Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445, 447-57 (1987).
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Exxon's stewardship function would become not only much more difficult but also
much more costly.45
In spite of this recognition, the oil and gas industry has not stan-
dardized its lease forms even though the overwhelming majority of pri-
vate oil and gas leases are embodied in preprinted forms, which are
presented to the landowner by the lessee.46 Legal printing companies,
individual landmen, or major oil companies may have drafted any given
form.47 Most forms have the same general size, shape, and terms. Many
are entitled "Revised Producers 88," based on a popular lease form first
printed in 1916, although that title has no descriptive meaning.48 The
forms usually are preprinted except for blanks for the insertion of a
description of the property; the amounts of the royalty (usually), delay
rentals, and bonus; the lessor's signature; and a notary's
acknowledgement.
In their terms, these preprinted forms are both uniform and dis-
tinctive. All the forms contain certain crucial clauses, such as the ha-
bendum clause, the definition of the royalties, or the force majeure
clause. In addition, almost all leases contain one or more varieties of
clauses on certain other topics. For example, almost all leases contain
one or more clauses dealing with the extension of the primary term of
the lease as a result of the lessee's efforts. Any one of the hundreds of
different preprinted forms, however, might employ different lease
clauses to cover these extensions. A particular lease might have: 1) a dry
hole clause, allowing the lessee to extend the primary term by drilling
another well immediately after completing a dry hole; 2) a well comple-
tion clause, allowing a lessee to extend the primary term while complet-
ing a well begun during the primary term; 3) a continuous operations
clause, allowing the lessee to continue the primary term as long as the
lessee maintains drilling operations on the parcel; 4) a cessation of pro-
duction clause, allowing the lessee to preserve its lease by specified ac-
tions if commercial production is interrupted; or 5) any combination of
45. R. HEBERT, NEGOTIATING A LEASE: LESSEE'S PERSPECTIVE 1 (1985) (source on file with
Author).
46. The text discusses leases of privately owned land. The federal government leases hydro-
carbon rights on its own form leases, which incorporate by reference an extensive body of federal
regulations. Other large lessors, such as the State of California, the University of Texas system,
and Stanford University, try to insist on using their own lease forms.
47. It will be interesting to see whether technology eliminates the preprinted form as evi-
dence of a form contract. With the spread of word processing, a firm can store a form contract in
its computers and print out a new original whenever necessary. The variable terms of the resulting
contract may be filled in on the word processor, rather than appearing as handwritten or typed
insertions in printed blanks. As a result, preprinted forms may disappear, making it increasingly
difficult to tell whether or not a document is a "form" contract.
48. See Moses, The Evolution and Development of the Oil and Gas Lease, 2 Sw. LEGAL




In addition to the lack of uniformity regarding which clauses are
included, each clause may differ in language from one lease form to the
next. Because these differences in clauses and language are not necess-
arily trivial, a secondary purchaser must be concerned both with which
clauses are in any particular form and with the language of those
clauses. Outside of California, where a different type of form lease is
used,50 form leases often are terminated automatically by the failure of
the lessee, or its assignee, to pay the exact amount of delay rentals to
the right parties, at the right time, by the right method. A failure to
meet the technical requirements of the specific language of a given lease
form can mean losing an extremely valuable lease.
Because the stakes can be so high, the absence of standardization is
costly. Yet standardization has not proceeded past single firms. Exxon
has its own standardized forms with minor variants for different states,
but there is no industry-wide standard "Texas" lease form. Although
industry groups have successfully created standard form joint operating
agreements to be used by companies cooperating in the same oil field,'
no similar standard lease form has been adopted or even proposed.
C. Corporate Securities
Securities markets are the largest and probably the oldest second-
ary markets for commodity contracts. When corporations or govern-
ments sell securities, they are, in essence, entering into contracts with
purchasers, as regulated by applicable state and federal law.
Securities issuers create these contracts. Federal and state securi-
ties laws allow issuers to choose, for the most part, whether the con-
tracts will be resold in the secondary markets. If a security is registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, its purchasers generally
49. The bias in favor of the traditional preprinted forms is so strong that many lease forms
contain obsolete clauses taken verbatim from their ancestors. One clause, still in common use,
entitles the lessor to the free use of any natural gas found on her property for the purpose of
cooking or lighting (but not heating) in her dwelling, long after the disappearance of gas lights.
50. A major geographical discrepancy further confounds lease form standardization. For ob-
scure reasons, a different "standard" lease form, sometimes labeled a "Revised Form 86," has long
been used in California. The California form is two or three times as long as the form used in the
rest of the country. The California form covers more topics and covers some topics, particularly
surface land use, in more detail. In addition, although until the 1970s the common lessor's royalty
in the rest of the country was one-eighth of production, in California the most common royalty was
one-sixth of production. These royalty shares were so common that the lease forms often included
the customary fraction as one of the preprinted terms.
51. The most successful of these forms may be the Rocky Mountain Joint Operating Agree-
ment, which governs the relationships between lessees in an oil or gas field that is being jointly
operated by one lessee on behalf of all others. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUND., ROCKY
MOUNTAIN JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT (1984).
[Vol. 42:133
CONTRACTS AS COMMODITIES
may resell it through securities exchanges to any buyers. Securities is-
sued without registration, pursuant to a statutory or regulatory exemp-
tion, usually may be sold only to a limited group of investors. Similar
distinctions prevail in the securities laws of many states.
The resale market for registered securities dwarfs the initial mar-
ket for registered securities. In 1986 new public offerings of registered
equity securities totalled about 74 billion dollars, compared to total
trading on registered stock exchanges of 1.7 trillion dollars.52 The same
year, the total volume on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) alone
equalled 1.37 trillion dollars.53 The National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation system (NASDAQ), which is not a regis-
tered stock exchange and thus is not included in the first figure, ac-
counted for an additional 378 billion dollars in stock sales.54
The corporation issuing registered securities does not know who
the eventual owners will be. The issuer creates the "contract," in this
case a security, with sales in mind not only to the underwriters or the
institutions with which the stock will be placed initially, but also to
millions of potential investors. The initial purchasers, of course, buy
those securities in part because they know that a further resale market
exists. Secondary purchasers, whether individual small investors or
massive pension funds, face information costs in shopping for invest-
ments. To the extent that an investment contract differs from some
standardized model, the investor incurs information costs in determin-
ing how the contract differs from the norm.5
Some attributes of securities traded in secondary markets are stan-
dardized; others are not. The words "common stock," "preferred stock,"
and "bond" define some aspects of securities. Federal securities laws
and regulations "write" into all traded securities additional standard
terms, such as reporting requirements and limitations on insider trad-
ing. Many of the remaining terms, express or implied, are determined
by the issuing corporations, their states of incorporation, or the ex-
changes on which the shares are listed. Consider the status of standard-
52. 46 SEC MONTHLY STATISTICAL REV., No. 2, at 10, 24-29 tables M-370 to M-376 (1987).
The figure for primary public offerings includes offerings of convertible bonds, preferred stock,
conventional common stock, limited partnership interests, voting trust certificates, condominium
securities, and other equity. Id. The overall figures given in the tables include $100 million in
unregistered securities that were issued under Regulation A. Id. at 23 table M-350. Although it is
not clear whether those unregistered securities are bonds or equity, they are insignificant com-
pared to the $74 billion in new equity offerings.
53. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FACT BOOK 1987, at 5 (1987).
54. NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, NASDAQ FACT BOOK 1988, at 8 (1988).
55. The stockholder faces increased administrative costs as well if ownership of the stock
ever requires an independent investigation of the underlying obligations by the stockholder-for
example, in the event of a proxy fight or a bankruptcy proceeding.
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ization in two such areas: Standardization of state corporation codes
and standardization of voting rights for common stock.
Many terms of the securities contract are written by the corpora-
tion codes of the states in which the issuers have chosen to incorporate.
These codes differ significantly and, in spite of efforts to produce model
or uniform corporations laws, the states probably will retain different
laws. Idaho law standardizes to some extent the securities of all firms
incorporated in Idaho, but, apart from federal law, those securities need
not conform to any national standard and necessarily differ from securi-
ties issued by corporations incorporated in other states. In spite of the
differing state corporations codes, a group of issuing companies can
standardize their contracts among themselves by choosing the same
state of incorporation. Without colluding, corporations could partici-
pate in de facto standardization by choosing to incorporate in a state
with an unusually large proportion of major publicly listed companies.
In fact, forty-three percent of the New York Stock Exchange listed
companies have chosen to incorporate in Delaware."6
Delaware's predominant position as the state of incorporation for
large public corporations has caused debate for the last fifteen years.
Some commentators have viewed Delaware's role as the result of a nox-
ious "race to the bottom," in which firms choose to incorporate in the
state with the least restrictive corporate laws.57 Others have maintained
that interstate competition for corporate charters leads to adoption of
state corporation laws that maximize the value of companies incorpo-
rating in those states; Delaware, these scholars urge, merely has pro-
duced the most efficient laws. 8 As Professor Romano pointed out in an
excellent article, neither view can explain convincingly why Delaware
has a stranglehold on major company incorporations. Other states could
have copied or surpassed the attractive aspects of Delaware's corpora-
tions code and undercut Delaware's price.59 A few commentators have
advanced explanations for Delaware's predominance focusing on market
56. N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 701.3, at 725-802 (May 27, 1988).
57. The seminal work in this vein is Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE
GIANT CORPORATION (1976); Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill
Cary, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187 (1983); Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 545 (1984).
58. Some of the more interesting works taking this view include Fischel, The "Race to the
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw.
U.L. REV. 913 (1982); Hyman, The Delaware Controversy-The Legal Debate, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L.
368 (1979); and Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6
J. LEG. STUD. 251 (1977). For further discussion, see R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION
(1978).
59. Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 225, 226 (1985).
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differentiation by states.0° Under this view, Delaware has been the only
state to pursue successfully the "big public firm" market niche. Ro-
mano's explanation is more complex, and more convincing.
Romano argues that Delaware obtained a large market share by be-
ing particularly responsive to the needs of Delaware-chartered corpora-
tions. This responsiveness stems from Delaware's entrenched depen-
dence on the corporate chartering "business" for public and private rev-
enue. Delaware retains its market share because corporate attorneys
recommend it. Delaware incorporation lowers the cost of providing legal
services to clients because it presents a familiar body of law and its
judicial interpretation of relevant portions of its corporations code is
more complete than states with fewer large corporations. Delaware's ad-
vantage is particularly significant at the time a firm decides where to
incorporate because, as Romano points out, most major companies
change their states of incorporation only in connection with transac-
tions that may lead to litigation.6 1
Romano's explanation overlooks a related advantage to companies
incorporating in Delaware. Just as corporate lawyers work more effi-
ciently when dealing with Delaware law, so do potential purchasers of
the firm's stock. Incorporating in Delaware performs a standardizing
function for investors as well as for corporate lawyers. Investors in a
corporation probably know and feel more comfortable with Delaware's
corporation law than, for example, with Idaho's. Participants in the se-
curities markets know Delaware's corporation law, either by study or by
reputation; incorporation in Idaho either might lead a potential investor
to spend time and effort examining Idaho's corporate laws or might
lower the value the investor places on the security to compensate for
the increased risk of dealing with unknown law. 2
60. See R POSNER & K. Scorr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION
(1980); Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 JL. & ECON.
179 (1985); Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1983).
61. Romano, supra note 59, at 235-42, 273-79 (discussing gaining and retaining market
share). An interesting recent article by Professors Macey and Miller expands upon these explana-
tions by pointing out the powerful role of the Delaware corporate bar, acting in self-interest, in
assuring corporations that Delaware's corporate law will remain generally congenial to their inter-
ests. Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L.
REv. 469 (1987).
62. One could argue that "the market" takes into account these factors and the price of the
stock automatically adjusts to reflect any substantive difference that Idaho's corporations law
makes to an investor. This argument is weak for two reasons. First, any individual investor (other
than someone assembling a portfolio that mirrors or encompasses the market) still has to decide
whether she believes the security is a "good" investment at a given price. The market quotations
do not tell that investor that the stock is worth $21.75, i.e., $22.00 per share, less 25 cents for
Idaho's corporations law. Second, even if the market adjusts prices to reflect these risks, the mar-
ket operates only through human beings (or perhaps human-programmed computers). Some per-
son still has to expend time and effort to analyze how Idaho's corporations laws affect the value of
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This advantage is closely related to, but distinct from, a claim that
Delaware's reputation confers an advantage on firms incorporating in
that state. Investors attracted by standardization do not favor Delaware
corporations because they know Delaware has a reputation for having
"good" corporate laws, but rather because they are familiar with its
laws, good or bad. In addition, that the voluntary acts of major public
corporations have made Delaware a de facto standard could lead inves-
tors to two conclusions: Delaware's laws are acceptable to most public
corporations and a Delaware-incorporated firm they invest in will not
be at a competitive disadvantage because of its state of incorporation.
Just as state corporations codes dictate some terms of the securities
contract, stock exchanges require some terms as conditions for listing a
security on their exchanges. Each "national securities exchange" or "na-
tional securities association" can set, within boundaries, requirements
for companies that wish to list their securities with that exchange or
association, subject to approval by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission .6 Through its listing requirements, the NYSE effectively pro-
hibited listed companies from issuing nonvoting common stock or
classes of common stock with substantially different voting power from
1926, well before the federal securities acts. 4 Other exchanges or as-
sociations need not follow the NYSE's requirements on voting strength
and, in fact, the two most important did not. The American Stock Ex-
change (Amex) prohibited listed companies from issuing nonvoting
common stock, but did not prohibit issuance of classes of common stock
with substantially different voting rights. 5 The National Association of
Securities Dealers imposed no limits on the voting rights of the com-
mon stock of the thousands of firms it lists through NASDAQ.66
All other things being equal, shares listed on the NYSE should
have been slightly more valuable than shares listed on the Amex be-
cause the NYSE effectively prohibited common stock with different
voting powers. Secondary purchasers of the NYSE-listed shares knew,
without looking, that all common shares of that firm had equivalent
voting rights. Secondary purchasers of Amex-listed shares either had to
a company's stock. Unless the analyst can appropriate the entire value of such information, the
market may well underproduce such analysis.
63. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1982); SEC Rule 19b-4,
17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1988).
64. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 313.00 (1984). The history of the so-called
"one share, one vote" requirement of the NYSE is traced, in fascinating detail, in Seligman, Equal
Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 687, 688-707 (1986).
65. AM. STOCK EXCH., COMPANY GUIDE, § 124 (1979).




ascertain the share's voting rights or risk a potentially unpleasant
surprise.
But all other things are not necessarily equal. Firms listed on the
NYSE have shown increasing interest in issuing shares with different
voting rights because classes of common stock with differential voting
power can serve as antitakeover devices. Amex and NASDAQ provided
alternative ways to list the stock without following NYSE's "one share,
one vote" rule. Faced with competition from Amex and NASDAQ, the
NYSE voted in September 1986 to amend its listing requirements to
allow a listed firm to have classes of common stock with different voting
rights.6 The NYSE submitted the proposed amendment for approval to
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Under legislative pressure, 8
the Commission responded to the NYSE filing by promulgating new
Rule 19c-4, a uniform listing requirement governing common stock vot-
ing rights on all national securities exchanges or national securities as-
sociations. 9 The new rule bans the issuance of new stock with disparate
voting rights that has the effect of disenfranchising existing
stockholders.
These market and regulatory changes made the "one share, one
vote" provision quite controversial and the subject of much scholarly
debate.7 0 While commentators have aired many of the substantive ad-
vantages and disadvantages of such rules, no commentator apparently
has considered the information cost savings that a standardized provi-
sion offers. The information cost savings do not necessarily support a
mandatory uniform rule across all securities markets. Companies whose
interest in common stock with differential voting'powers is sufficiently
great to overcome the cost advantages to their secondary purchas-
ers-and hence the price disadvantages to themselves-of standardiza-
tion should be able to find a market for trading that stock. On the other
67. 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1389-92 (Sept. 19, 1986).
68. In 1985 identical bills were introduced in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate that would have imposed a "one share, one vote" rule on all publicly traded common stock.
See H.R. 2783, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 1314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). A similar provi-
sion was included in the Tender Offer Reform Act, H.R. 2122, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), intro-
duced by Congressman John D. Dingell.
69. Final Rule, SEC Voting Rights Listing Standards, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376 (July 12, 1988).
The rule has been challenged in court by the Business Roundtable IRRC. 5 CoRP. GOVERNANCE
BU.LETIN 124 (Sept. 10, 1988).
70. See Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1671 (1985); Dent, Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 725 (1986); Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common
Stock, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 119 (1987); Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Rele-
vance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807 (1987); Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common
Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1988); Seligman, supra note 64;
Note, Dual Class Recapitalization and Shareholder Voting Rights, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1987).
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hand, the SEC should permit an exchange to refuse to list such stock if
a "one share, one vote" requirement is more valuable than the addi-
tional listings to be gained from allowing nonstandard common stock.
This Article does not argue that standardization motivated the
adoption of federal securities laws, the Delaware corporations code, and
the NYSE listing requirements. Delaware did not become a popular
state of incorporation by offering a standard corporation code. It gained
the added attraction of being the de facto standard after it became a
disproportionately popular state of incorporation for substantive rea-
sons probably unrelated to standardization. Similarly, the NYSE insti-
tuted its "one share, one vote" rule in 1926 after popular outcry about
the "banker control" of publicly traded corporations.7 1 The NYSE's
goal was not to increase the value of the listed companies by lowering
information costs to secondary purchasers, but the increase in value
should have been one of the results. The value of standardization,
though it may be small in any given case, needs to be remembered and
weighed in analyzing securities or any other contract commodity.72
V. ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
No major barriers prevent a firm from standardizing its own form
contracts. If a firm concludes that it should use one mortgage form,
then it will adopt one mortgage form. Between firms, however, stan-
dardization is more difficult to achieve. In the three examples discussed,
the standardization that did occur resulted either through the efforts of
market participants with very large market shares (the FHLMC and
the FNMA for residential mortgages; Delaware for corporate charters)
or through indirect government regulation (one share, one vote condi-
tions imposed through listing requirements adopted under federal gov-
ernment authority). Lacking those forces, the oil and gas industry has
not standardized forms.73
No one can quantify the amount of standardization in contract
71. Seligman, supra note 64, at 693-97.
72. The structures of the securities markets and of federal securities regulation provide sev-
eral opportunities for exploring the extent and limits of secondary purchaser influence in such
standardization. Nonregistered, privately placed securities, for which there is no secondary market,
are likely to be less standardized than registered securities. Similarly, any one issuer is likely to
produce relatively standardized securities (at least within the broad and generally understood clas-
ses of securities such as common stock, preferred stock, and various bonds) for the same reasons a
retailer standardizes its credit contracts. The single firm faces none of the collective action
problems that can make standardization within an industry difficult.
73. A producer or producers with monopoly power can also force standardization, not as a
way of exercising market power, but as a way of increasing the value of their product to their




commodities; attempting close comparisons with the amount of stan-
dardization of tangible products is foolish. Nevertheless, tangible prod-
ucts, in general, are much more standardized than contract
commodities.
The more difficult question is whether the current amount of
standardization of contract commodities is the right amount. The prob-
lem is intractable. Advocates of change tell "just so" stories about mar-
ket failures that prevent an efficient level of standardization. Advocates
of the status quo tell their own stories about markets successfully com-
pensating for those supposed failures in this best of all possible worlds.
Perhaps, like the fullness or emptiness of a twelve ounce glass holding
six ounces, the answer is more likely to come from the predilections of
the observer than from any data. The discrepancy in standardization
between contract commodities and tangible goods is striking, but what,
if anything, does it mean?
Although I do not know the answer to this question, there is an
approach worth trying. The approach begins by identifying the factors
that lead to an inefficient use of standardized form contracts compared
to standardized tangible goods. Removing or minimizing those barriers
would allow participants in the market to adopt voluntary standards
only if the standards were to their advantage. The retailers who either
did or did not adhere to the proposed forms would draw the short-term
utility balance. But the analysis cannot end there. Standardization
could have negative effects external to those participants. Standardiza-
tion might cause a decline in distributional equity (however measured)
or a drop in the "dynamic efficiency" of the market through a decline in
useful innovation. If we become convinced that a greater amount of
standardization would neither cause serious inequity nor inhibit useful
innovation, then, as a matter of policy, we should remove the interfer-
ing factors and let the market determine the proper level of
standardization.
This test is weak. It depends on the assumption that we can be
confident that any adverse distributional or dynamic effects of remov-
ing barriers to standardization are minimal. If that assumption is true,
and the standards are truly voluntary, then they will be adopted only if
they are of more value to the participants in the transactions than the
nonstandardized forms. If the participants win and no one loses, then
the result is Pareto-superior to the previous state of the world. If, on
the other hand, the distributional or dynamic costs are significant, then
this test makes no attempt to weigh those costs against the gains, prob-
ably small, of increased standardization.
This section of the Article explores this analysis. The first subsec-
tion discusses four differences between contract commodities and tangi-
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ble goods that help to explain why contract commodities are less
standardized, and one countervailing factor that suggests standardiza-
tion might be overused in both fields. The second subsection discusses
the possible costs in distributional equity and in innovation of an in-
crease in contract commodity standardization. The final section sug-
gests how further standardization could be encouraged.
A. Barriers to an Efficient Level of Contract Commodity
Standardization
Four barriers discourage contract commodity standardization more
than tangible product standardization: collective action problems, fed-
eralism, substantive legal constraints, and lawyers. Bureaucratic inertia
also may keep standardization at an inefficient level; it is unclear, how-
ever, whether inertia would increase or decrease standardization.
The problems of collective action afflict any attempt at standardi-
zation, from weights and measures to computer operating systems to
form contracts to the price of crude oil. Although standardization of
form contracts may not present the social costs associated with cartels,
contract standardizers and cartels share the problems of creating and
enforcing agreement. Getting a wide range of people to agree to any-
thing, including a standardized contract form, is expensive, time con-
suming, and difficult-the more numerous and scattered the parties
who must agree, the more expensive the job. One writer gives an exam-
ple from his own limited efforts to create a widely acceptable mortgage
form:
The writer must confess that as counsel for a mortgage banker he has developed a
standardized set of mortgage forms for both residential and income property lend-
ing which have been approved by more than 30 institutional investors, but it is not
a job he would ever again undertake since it involved almost three years of con-
stant work in collaboration with outside counsel and the legal departments of each
of the investors. Again, it was a matter of convenience to an institution rather than
thinking in terms of making the product saleable in a secondary market. Further-
more, the end product, like all legal documents that emerge from compromises,
contains pet clauses of some investors which proved to be nonnegotiable.7 4
Although this collective action problem plagues any kind of stand-
ardization, tangible products do have the network of voluntary stan-
dards-setting organizations, with their own procedures, traditions, and
credibility, to make the job possible. These organizations lower the
transactions costs of arriving at a consensus standard and also increase
the expectations of the parties to the process that others will adhere to
the standard. By contrast, few such voluntary standards-setting organi-
74. Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interaction of Economics, Consumerism
and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & Ta. J. 397, 399 n.2 (1972).
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zations control contract commodities. The consultation process em-
ployed by FHLMC and FNMA in promulgating their standard
mortgage forms or the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute's role in
suggesting a standard oil and gas operating agreement probably come as
close as any example to an ANSI-approved standardization process.71
The absence of a structure for standards setting makes adoption of
a voluntary standard less likely. A company has little incentive to aban-
don its own familiar product or form in order to adopt someone else's
unless the industry agrees to adopt it as well. The advantages of stan-
dardization only come when nearly everyone abides by the standard.
Unless producers or consumers expect others to abide by the standard,
no one will be the first to move.
The voluntary standards-setting process for tangible products cre-
ates the expectation that others will follow a standard once it has been
set. Producers expect other producers to adopt the standard established
by the committees. Consumers who were represented in the standards-
setting process expect their producers to meet that standard. Without a
credible focus for standardization, producers have no incentive to rally
around any one product or form. Each wants the others to adopt its
form as the standard.
Professors Goetz and Scott have noted statements suggesting that
a small group of Wall Street law firms may create new standardized
forms of covenants, indentures, and other corporate agreements."6 This
exception may illustrate the rule: these firms are all located in the same
part of Manhattan and form a cohesive society. Not surprisingly, the
costs of coordinating a standard form are unusualy low in this setting.
It also may be significant that although no one law firm would reap the
full benefits from a new covenant, each firm in the small group of firms
involved in this representation would capture some benefit.
De facto standards may emerge as a result of a product's domi-
nance in the market. If, for whatever reason, the IBM personal com-
puter or Delaware corporation law becomes the "market leader," then
other firms may conform. But without either a standardization process
or a dominant product arising from causes other than standardization,
transactions costs, including uncertainty about the actions of other
market participants, strongly discourage contract commodity stan-
dardization.
The problem of federalism and form contracts is simply that differ-
ent legal regimes may require different form contracts. For example, the
75. Organizations promoting uniform laws, such as the American Law Institute or the Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, provide a similar function for state legislation.
76. Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 304-05.
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FNMA and the FHLMC cannot have one form residential mortgage,
but must have a form mortgage with riders for each different state.
Similarly, the rights and duties that form the securities contract vary
among companies incorporated in different states as a result of each
chartering state's corporation laws. Firms can mitigate these federalism
problems in some circumstances. A firm can choose its state of incorpo-
ration, structure a transaction with choice of law problems in mind, or,
in some cases, insert an effective choice of law clause. Even when avail-
able, none of these solutions is likely to be free of costs.
Similar problems arise with tangible products. For example, Flor-
ida and California both can define the characteristics of a legally mar-
ketable tangible product and yet use different definitions.77 For
example, in the aftermath of the two energy crises of the 1970s, states
enacted different energy conservation standards for home appliances,
which forced industry to produce different refrigerators for different
states. Interestingly, industry responded by working with the Natural
Resources Defense Council and other environmental groups to convince
Congress to pass preemptive federal legislation setting uniform national
standards.78
Federalism impedes the standardization of contract commodities
more than that of tangible products because states regulate the charac-
teristics of these contracts more heavily than they regulate the design of
most tangible products. As Professors Goetz and Scott have demon-
strated, this regulation involves not only legislative action, but, perhaps
more importantly, judicial interpretation. 9 These contracts are the very
stuff of the law and the subjects of millions of state court cases; not
surprisingly, the law treats them in more detail than it does the charac-
teristics of tangible products. By doing so, states partially standardize
77. Notable commerce clause cases have resulted from states doing exactly that, apparently
in efforts to favor their own producers. For example, in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), Florida growers challenged a California standard that defined ripe (and
hence legally marketable) avocados by fat content in a way that always excluded Florida's slightly
different variety of avocados. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432
U.S. 333 (1977), North Carolina had adopted legislation banning the use of any grading system for
apples sold in North Carolina other than the federal grading system. Washington, which produced
30% of the nation's apples, had long had its own, more stringent, apple grading system. The North
Carolina legislation standardizing apple grading thus had the effect of excluding the country's ma-
jor producer.
78. See generally S. REP. No. 6, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Both houses of Congress unani-
mously passed the legislation on October 15, 1986, at the end of the 99th Congress, only to have it
subjected to a pocket veto by President Reagan. An identical bill was introduced at the beginning
of the 100th Congress, passed overwhelmingly, signed, and enacted as the National Appliance En-
ergy Conservation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-12, 101 Stat. 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
6201).
79. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 3.
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contracts within each state, but the process makes standardization be-
tween states more difficult."
Substantive law constrains the adoption of standardized forms for
contract commodities in at least two ways. First, courts may consider
standardized forms to be "contracts of adhesion" and therefore limit
their enforcement. Second, the process of standardizing the forms
might violate federal or state antitrust laws.
Courts long have used the doctrine of contracts of adhesion to re-
fuse to enforce provisions in form contracts that they considered unfair
to the consumer. In refusing to enforce certain provisions, judges often
have based their opinions on the ground that the consumer had no op-
portunity to bargain over the terms of the contract, but was confronted
with a form and was required to "take it or leave it." 1 When an indus-
try adopts standard forms, the consumer has no choice among a variety
of "take it or leave it" offers from different firms, thus arguably increas-
ing the form's "adhesive" power.8"
Federal antitrust laws also pose a potential substantive limitation
to standardization." As on other occasions when firms join together,
they are able to use the standards-setting process to restrain either
themselves or other competitors. While there is little, if any, precedent
concerning the application of antitrust laws to contract commodity
standardization, plaintiffs long have attacked, with some success, the
anticompetitive implications of the standardization of tangible
products."'
80. Of course, just as appliance makers can overcome state by state differences with preemp-
tive federal law, so can retailers of contract commodities. One example of this strategy may be the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94
Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), which, among other things, preempted state
usury laws for certain residential mortgages. Section 501(a)(1) of that Act replaced state usury
standards with a national usury standard, providing not only higher rates, but, for a time, a na-
tional standard. Id. § 501(a)(1), at 161 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1982)). Section 501(b)(2) of
the Act, however, allowed states to reimpose individual usury limits on such lines by legislation
passed before April 1, 1983. Id. § 501(b)(2), at 162 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1982)).
81. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 559A-559I (C. Kaufman ed. Supp. 1984); RESTATEMENT
SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979); Rakoff, supra note 3, at 1190-97 (describing the current
doctrine).
82. On the other hand, a court might be more likely to enforce a term against a consumer if
the term was an industry-wide voluntary standard, set through a process that included consumer
representation, than if the retailer had unilaterally promulgated the form contract.
83. State antitrust laws may have the same effect. I ignore them only because their variety
makes generalization difficult.
84. See generally D. HEMENWAY, supra note 21, at 76-78. The seminal antitrust case, United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), dealt with, among other things, an agreement
by pottery companies not to sell "seconds"-pottery that fell below certain quality standards.
Firms can use standards to prevent themselves from increasing competition, as in Trenton Pot-
teries, or firms can prevent competitors using new methods or technologies from invading their
market by product standards, as in American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel
1989]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
In American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) v.
Hydrolevel Corp.,8 5 for example, the plaintiff successfully alleged that
boiler manufacturing companies had used an ASME standard to pre-
vent the plaintiff from competing with an innovative boiler safety fea-
ture. In the more recent case of Indian Head Inc. v. Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp.,6 the plaintiff, a manufacturer of a polyvinyl chloride
electrical conduit, claimed that a competitor had attempted to prevent
the National Fire Protection Association from approving the conduit in
the National Electrical Code, a voluntary standard widely incorporated
in local building codes. If the competitor had been successful, the plain-
tiff's conduit could not be used legally in large portions of the country.
Because of this kind of alleged anticompetitive behavior, legislation
was introduced in Congress during the 1970s to limit or regulate private
standards organizations above and beyond any antitrust constraints.,
Although those proposals bore no fruit, potential antitrust liability con-
tinued. During the Carter Administration, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion asserted its interest in the standardizing process through a
rulemaking proceeding. The Commission completed hearings on a pro-
posed rule in 1980, but did not close the proceeding until 1985. It then
rejected any regulation partly because of changes in the standards-set-
ting organizations' complaint procedures that resulted from the 1982
ASME case:
The Commission's decision was based on a determination that there is inadequate
evidence to indicate that anticompetitive practices are sufficiently widespread to
justify an industry-wide rule, particularly in light of recent changes in practices of
standards developers in response to a Supreme Court decision holding a standards
developer responsible for the anticompetitive practices of its members. Rather, the
Commission intends to use case-by-case enforcement against specific instances of
abuse in the standards development and certification process. 88
In spite of substantial judicial and administrative litigation, no one
knows the limits of federal antitrust liability in this area. One commen-
tator suggests that courts should handle standardization cases under a
Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) or Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987).
85. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
86. 817 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987). The Supreme Court had held
that the Noerr-Pennington defense to antitrust liability was not available to the defendant to
immunize its efforts to influence the National Fire Protection Association even though its National
Electric Code was automatically incorporated in many local building codes.
87. R. DIXON, supra note 24, at 6.
88. FTC, Notice of Completed Rulemakings, 50 Fed. Reg. 44,971, 44,971-72 (1985); see FTC,
Standards and Certification: Notice of Publication of Presiding Officer's Report, 48 Fed. Reg.
25,218 (1983); FTC, Standards and Certification: Availability of Final Staff Report, 48 Fed. Reg.




rule of reason analysis, subject to a public welfare defense, but acknowl-
edges that neither part of this recommendation is clearly established in
the case law."9 Particularly when the standards of legal conduct are not
clear, possible antitrust liability discourages standardization of contract
commodities.
A final barrier to standardization stems not from economics, feder-
alism, or substantive law, but from the attitudes of lawyers. The law-
yers who draft or review contracts and lease forms may not understand
or fully share their clients' interests in standardization. To the extent
that agency problems keep a company's attorneys from reflecting or ex-
pressing the company's interests in standardized contracts, attorneys
may underuse such contracts.
Law school does not prepare lawyers to view themselves as product
designers. Attorneys are trained to think about the legal consequences
of the documents they design and, under the prevailing view of legal
ethics, to advance their clients' interests as far as the client
wishes-which usually is assumed to be as far as possible. As a result,
attorneys draft documents with legal frills not included in the standard
industry form. One could ascribe overdrafting to an attorney's wish to
justify his fees, but more than fees may be involved. Instead, overdraft-
ing may reflect lawyers' attempts to justify their worth by meeting pro-
fessional norms of craftsmanship. "Good lawyers" think they can
improve any document. Standard forms may be no exception.9
No harm may result if the client closely controls his lawyer. The
client, perhaps more aware of the advantages of using the standard
form, can listen to the lawyer's suggestions, weigh the specific legal ad-
vantages against the benefits of standardization, and accept or reject
the lawyer's draft. The clients for whom contract commodities are
drafted may be more knowledgeable and legally sophisticated than the
average client, but it still may prove difficult for them to assert them-
selves against the lawyer's mystique. Agency problems between attor-
ney and client are still possible.
Finally, firms have agency problems close to home. A firm's officers
or employees may make the firm behave in ways that advance their
personal interests rather than the interests of the firm. These agency
89. Goldenberg, Standards, Public Welfare Defenses, and the Antitrust Laws, 42 Bus. LAW.
629, 638-39, 643-46 (1987).
90. An alternative, more cynical explanation is that lawyers seek marketing advantages
through product differentiation. The attorney increases the value of his services to a client by tying
that client to an unusual, nonstandard form. Another attorney would have to spend some time and
effort studying the form to be able to advise the client and thus would be at a disadvantage in
trying to gain that client's business. Of course, neither explanation is inconsistent with an attorney




problems might affect a firm's decision to standardize, although the di-
rection of the effect is unclear.
Employees may prefer standardized contracts because the forms
make their jobs easier, whether or not standardizing benefits the firm. A
firm possibly could profit by spending time and effort to analyze sepa-
rate forms, but its employees may not want to spend the time and effort
required to realize that benefit. Alternatively, risk averse employees
may prefer standardized forms because standardized forms shield em-
ployees from blame. Employees might conclude that they would not be
blamed for buying or using the industry standard even if it eventually
causes their firm problems. This reaction could affect not only form
contracts, but also all kinds of standardized products, from bolts to
IBM-compatible computers.
Of course, when speculating about how self-interest affects behav-
ior, it is easy to hypothesize exactly opposite effects. One could guess
just as easily that employees would underuse form contracts in order to
justify an overly large purchasing department and build their own em-
pire. The ultimate significance of this agency problem is hard to deter-
mine, but its possible implications should not be ignored.
B. External Costs of Increased Contract Commodity
Standardization
Direct, perceptible gains and losses to the parties from standard-
izing contracts should be reflected in the value of those contracts to the
retailers. Changes in distribution and changes in future efficiency are
effects of standardization that may not affect retailers directly.
The effects of greater standardization on distributional equity are
unclear. An industry-wide voluntary standard, instituted largely for the
convenience of retailers and secondary purchasers, might work against
consumers-home buyers, oil and gas lessors, securities investors, or
others. That possibility already exists to an equally strong degree in
industries in which each firm has its own standard form. As the litera-
ture on adhesive contracts suggests, few consumers negotiate the "legal
terms" of contracts. The price may be negotiable; with rare exceptions,
the "boilerplate" terms of the form are not.
Consumers or their representatives currently have no role in draft-
ing form contracts. Under a system of standardization similar to the
system for tangible products or similar to the process used by FHLMC
and FNMA to draft their uniform mortgages, consumer representatives
would participate in drafting the contracts. In the case of the FHLMC
and FNMA mortgage forms, consumer representatives played an impor-
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tant role in drafting the form. 1 Increased standardization through such
a procedure could not leave consumers worse off than the present non-
system; it ought to improve their positions.2
The effect of an industry-wide standard on innovation in contract
forms is more difficult to determine. Even if the standardization of
forms leads to a more efficient economy today, the result could be disas-
trous if mandatory standard forms were frozen into place, to govern
what might be a very different future.
Even voluntary standardization discourages some innovation. A
firm should adopt a voluntary standard form contract only if its bene-
fits from the use of form outweigh the costs. The firm should apply the
same analysis in deciding whether to depart from the voluntary stan-
dard in favor of an innovation. If voluntary standards exist, some inno-
vations that would have been adopted in the absence of standardization
will not be adopted. Whether or not a standard exists, a firm that
adopts an innovation in forms faces costs in printing, in retraining its
staff, and in educating its consumers or secondary purchasers about a
new form. If there is an industry-wide standard, then the firm faces
another cost; it loses the premium in the secondary market for stan-
dardization. This discouragement of innovation is not necessarily a
problem. Using the older form as a standard would be preferable to
using either the old form or the new form without a standard, but it
would be worse than having the innovative form as a new standard.
The solution to the problem of innovation is to make the "new im-
proved" form the new standard. When the standards-setting process re-
mains in place, firms can propose changes to the old standard form,
enabling them to change forms while keeping the benefits of standardi-
zation. This solution is not perfect because changing standards would
not be costless.
First, the industry would face the additional cost of another stan-
dards-setting process. Second, as Professors Goetz and Scott argue in
the context of state-required implied contract terms, the existence of
one standard can make it more difficult to innovate successfully, as
market participants and courts persist in putting the new language in
the old pigeonholes.9 3 Third, once the new standard is adopted, some of
the benefits of standardization are lost. Information and administration
91. See generally Jensen, supra note 74.
92. The question remains who will receive the benefits of standardization: the consumer, the
retailer, or the secondary purchaser. No a priori answer seems possible. Those benefits could be
reflected in a lower price to the consumer, in a higher price from the secondary purchaser to the
retailer, in greater profits for the secondary purchaser, or in any combination of the three. The
incidence of the benefits should vary with the structure of the relevant markets.
93. Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 290-91.
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costs increase as secondary purchasers are forced to determine whether
a given contract is in the old or the new standard form.
The existence of standards for some kinds of products poses even
greater barriers to innovation. Many tangible good standards are what
Professor Hemenway defined as "interchangeability standards." For ex-
ample, a standard format for laying out the letters on a typewriter key-
board involves an enormous investment in human capital; even if
changing typing technology made the old keyboard inefficient, the stan-
dard could not be changed without retraining millions of typists.94 For-
tunately, form contracts generally are what Hemenway termed "single
product standards" ' 5 and thus can be changed without major retraining
or replacement of complementary equipment. If the form contract
would involve an interchangeability standard, even voluntary standardi-
zation should proceed warily because of the potential barriers to
innovation.
C. Encouraging Contract Commodity Standardization
Based on the analysis above, the costs of contract standardization
to distributional equity and discouraging innovation seem small. If
these costs are small, what can be done to encourage efficient contract
commodity standardization? Promoting voluntary standards-setting or-
ganizations similar to those found for tangible goods offers the best so-
lution. Administrative actions, like those taken by Hoover's Commerce
Department concerning tangible products, or legislation could en-
courage industries to form organizations to discuss standardizing their
contract forms. Any encouragement should have two conditions: stan-
dards-setting organizations must include consumer representatives and
proposed standards must be voluntary.
Consumer representation may reduce the bargaining imbalance and
possible overreaching in current form contracts. Currently, each firm
produces its own form contract without opportunity for comments by
consumer organizations. Promoting forums in which many firms' forms
can be affected simultaneously should increase both the likelihood and
the effectiveness of participation by consumer groups.
Requiring standards to be voluntary should limit their costs. If the
94. For a fascinating history of keyboards and an analysis of the continuing power of the
inefficient "QWERTY" keyboard compared to the much more efficient Dvorak alternative, see
David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. ECON. REv. 332 (1985), and David, Under-
standing the Economics of QWERTY: The Necessity of History, in ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THE
MODERN ECONOMIST 30 (W. Parker ed. 1986). The limited recent economic literature on standardi-
zation has focused on barriers to innovation caused by interchangeability standards or "network
externalities." See supra note 21.
95. See generally HEMENWAY, supra note 21.
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standard is not efficient, then firms in the industry will ignore it. If a
standard operates poorly in a specific case, then an individual firm will
use a different form in that situation. If the market now has the effi-
cient, "correct" amount of standardization, then the voluntary stan-
dards either will not be created or, if created, will be ignored. Unless
the voluntary standards stifle innovation, society will have lost only the
time involved in the standards-setting process.
Promoting standards-setting organizations, similar to those used
for tangible products, would decrease many of the barriers to standard-
izing form contracts. Organizations could go far to limit the collective
action problems firms face by both lowering the transactions costs in
writing standards and increasing the probabilities that the agreed upon
standards would be adopted. Industry concerns about contract enforce-
ability or antitrust liability might be ameliorated by encouraging an
open process with consumer representation. Standards also would de-
crease the barriers posed by firms' lawyers by focusing attention on the
process of standardizing. Only the problems of federalism would remain
untouched, and even state legislatures might be persuaded by voluntary
standards to move toward national uniformity.
As long as barriers to standardization keep form contracts un-
derused, there are gains to be achieved, gains in working hours and lives
no longer devoted to reading, analyzing, and rereading endless varia-
tions on a theme. But how much time and money is unclear; the magni-
tude of the possible benefits may not justify much effort in light of the
possible costs. Although one cannot predict the benefits of such a
change with accuracy, the difference between the standardization of
tangible goods and contract commodities is so striking and the probable
costs are so low that careful encouragement of voluntary standard form
contracts makes sense.
VI. CONCLUSION
[A] consumer contract of adhesion looks like a classic bargained contract. A con-
sumer contract is not a thing, at least not the way cars, cows and couches are
things, and no rhetoric is going to convince anyone for long that it is. Thus the real
hope of an exercise like this is necessarily more modest than any total sensory
transformation. It can aspire at most temporarily to smash the semantic box in
which our current thinking is locked."
By conceptualizing form contracts as commodities, this Article has
tried to create a theoretical framework for thinking about their preva-
lence. Although the framework does implicate public policy, it probably
is most useful as a guide to empirical work into the standardization of




But why bother? Concern with the style of the fine print in legal
documents may appear to be true formalism, but the real issue is law-
making power. An enforceable contract becomes the law between the
parties, displacing whatever more general statutory or common law.
The laws of residential mortgages may vary from state to state, but for
eighty percent of recent mortgagors, the relevant law came not from
their state's courts or legislatures, but from the FNMA and the
FHLMC. Pressures from such secondary purchasers create a realm of
law that is neither public law nor truly individual private law.
Law school education, teaching, and often research focuses on law
books-the cases, statutes and regulations. But as teachers and scholars
of law, our real concern is not-or should not be-the books or the
models they contain, but the world they attempt to describe or control.
In many respects, the world does not follow the model the law
prescribes. 7 This Article attempts to foster a better understanding of
the pressures that lead to standard forms, and thus a better under-
standing of the roles of private entities in making law-not the law of
the codes, the reports, and the hornbooks, but the law of some corners
of the real world.
97. See, e.g., Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
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